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COMMENT
BURDEN OF PROOF IN LAND USE REGULATION: A
UNIFIED APPROACH AND APPLICATION TO FLORIDA
CARL J. PECKINPAUGH, JR.
The power to regulate land use is an aspect of the police power
reserved to the states.1 The states, in turn, have generally regarded
land use control as a local matter and so have delegated most of
their power to regulate land use to local units of government.2 Be-
cause local land use decisions have traditionally been treated by
courts as legislative actions, a presumption of validity attaches to
such decisions. The party disputing the action must therefore bear
the heavy burden of proving a constitutional violation.8 Thus, the
characterization of such decisions as "legislative" raises a formida-
ble obstacle to the challenging landowner. The challenger's heavy
burden of proof applies to zoning changes as well as original zoning
decisions since changes have similarly been characterized as legis-
lative actions.5
Recently, some land use regulation decisions have questioned
the continued validity of the traditional characterization of zon-
ing.6. One primary concern is the relative informality of most land
use control decisions, especially in the area of rezoning, which cre-
ates opportunities for abuse of authority by decisionmakers. An-
other concern is that the burden of proof on the party disputing a
zoning action is so harsh that effective review is unavailable.7 To
deal with these problems, new rules concerning the burden of proof
and presumptions of validity have been developed in the land use
regulation area, but the evolution of these new rules has been
piecemeal and disorganized.8 There has been much consequent ju-
dicial confusion in this area, as exemplified by a recent, poorly-
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Land use regulation usu-
ally is in the form of zoning at the local level. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §
2.01 (2d ed. 1976).
2. R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 2.01.
3. Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action,
33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 130-31 (1972).
4. R. FISHMAN, HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 263-64 (1978).
5. Id. at 264-65.
6. Comment, supra note 3, at 132.
7. See R. FISHMAN, supra note 4, at 263-80. See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at
§§ 3.14-.22.
8. See, e.g., R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at §§ 3.17 & 3.18.
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reasoned, Florida appellate decision, Estuary Properties, Inc. v.
Askew.9
The purpose of this comment is to present a unified approach to
the problems of burden of proof and the presumption of decisional
validity within the context of land use regulation. The traditional
view and two of the modern approaches will be examined, and one
of them-generally referred to as the Fasano approach-will be
demonstrated to be the most consistent with general Florida law as
it has developed outside the field of land use regulation.
The traditional view of local land use regulation was first de-
scribed in 1926 by the United States Supreme Court in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.10 In that case, the village of Euclid
had adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance under which the
entire village was divided into six classes of use districts." The or-
dinance was attacked by a landowner on the grounds that it de-
prived him of liberty and property without due process of law, and
that it denied him equal protection of law in violation of the four-
teenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. In the same re-
spects it was claimed to offend the Ohio Constitution. 12 The al-
leged harm was that the zoning prevented the landowner from
fully utilizing his property. In upholding the constitutionality of
the ordinance, the Court stated that:
If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes
be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control.
[I]t must be said before the ordinance can be declared un-
constitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and un-
reasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.'3
This "fairly debatable" test became the standard for judicial re-
view of most local land use decisions.14
The first attempt by some state courts to ameliorate the effect of
9. 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), set for oral argument, No. 58,485 (Fla.,
May 2, 1980).
10. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For a discussion of the holding in Euclid, see discussion in
Bronstein & Erickson, Zoning Amendments in Michigan-Two Recent Developments, 50 J.
URBAN L. 729, 733 (1973) and R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 3.09.
11. 272 U.S. at 379-80.
12. Id. at 384.
13. Id. at 388, 395 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
14. R. FISHMAN, supra note 4, at 42.
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the test's extreme deference to legislative judgments was the adop-
tion of a shifting burden of proof. Professor McCormick has stated
that a burden of proof actually consists of two separate burdens.1'
The first is the burden of going forward with the evidence; that is,
the burden "of producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a
particular fact in issue. The second is the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the alleged fact is true."" In most situations, the
burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion are
placed on the party who "seeks to change the present state of af-
fairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the
risk of failure of proof or persuasion.' 7 Failure to meet the first
burden, that of producing evidence, exposes a party to an adverse
ruling.'8 If a party meets the burden of producing evidence, how-
ever, the burden of producing counter-evidence may shift to the
adverse party.'9 The second burden, the burden of persuasion, does
not shift, and it becomes important only after all the evidence has
been presented. After the presentation of all the evidence, if the
trier of fact has not been convinced by the party upon whom the
burden of persuasion has been placed, that party will have failed
to satisfy its burden and will lose. 0
In Board of Supervisors v. Snell Construction Corp.," the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court adopted a shifting-burden-of-proof approach
to local land use regulation. The court still recognized zoning as
legislative activity, presumed to be valid so long as not unreasona-
ble or arbitrary, but it held that once evidence of unreasonableness
is presented by the landowner, the zoning authority must produce
its own evidence of reasonableness. If the issue is thereby rendered
"fairly debatable," the zoning ordinance stands; if not, the pre-
sumption of legislative validity is defeated and the ordinance must
be stricken.' 2 In Snell, the trial court struck a rezoning of twenty-
six acres which the County Board of Supervisors had changed from
the high density authorized by the previous board to a medium
density development.'3 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed,
15. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. 1972).
16. Id. (footnotes omitted).
17. Id. at § 337.
18. Id. at § 336.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 202 S.E.2d 889, 892-93 (Va. 1974) (citing Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d
390, 395 (Va. 1959)).
22. Id. at 893.
23. Id. at 891-92.
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holding that the evidence (presented by the county upon the land-
owner's motion for declaratory judgment) was insufficient even to
make the rezoning action fairly debatable."4 In short, the county
did not meet its burden of producing evidence. The purpose of the
shifting-burden-of-proof approach is to promote stability and pre-
dictability in the zoning process, according the the Virginia Su-
preme Court, which stated the rule as follows:
[W]hen an aggrieved landowner makes a prima facie showing
that since enactment of the prior ordinance there has been no
change in circumstances substantially affecting the public health,
safety, or welfare, the burden of going forward with evidence of
such mistake, fraud, or changed circumstances shifts to the gov-
erning body. If the governing body produces evidence sufficient to
make reasonableness fairly debatable, the ordinance must be sus-
tained. If not, the ordinance is unreasonable and void. 5
Snell was a down-zoning case,2O but its rationale is equally appli-
cable to zoning actions which could increase the allowable uses of
property as illustrated by DeKalb County v. Flynn,7 in which the
Georgia Supreme Court adopted a shifting-burden approach. In
Flynn, a landowner attempted to persuade the County Board of
Commissioners to rezone 11.2 acres from single family residential
to office and distribution zoning.2' The court stated that "[t]he
Board's zoning enjoys an initial presumption of validity, which the
property owner must overcome by showing that the zoning is sig-
nificantly detrimental to him and insubstantially related to gov-
erning public interests.' 29 Once the landowner meets its burden of
24. Id. at 893-94.
25. Id. at 893 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. In general, "rezoning" is "a change in existing zoning rules and regulations within
a district, subdivision or other comparatively large area in a given governmental unit."
Troup v. Bird, 53 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1951). A change in zoning may result in more restric-
tions on use of the land, generally called "down-zoning." See, e.g., Snell, 202 S.E.2d at 893.
A zoning change resulting in less restrictions on use is called "up-zoning." See, e.g., Fasano
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). See also R. FISHmAN, supra note 4, at
363-65. Since the term "rezoning" generally contemplates that the area has been previously
zoned, Durocher v. King County, 492 P.2d 547 (Wash. 1972), technically the term "down-
zoning" might not be applicable in an initial zoning of land. Note, however, that the initial
zoning of any unit of land has the effect of a down-zoning since no zoning is always less
restrictive than any zoning classification. See generally Williamson, Constitutional and Ju-
dicial Limitations on the Community's Power to Downzone, 12 URs. LAw. 157 (1980).
27. 256 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 1979).
28. Id. at 363.
29. Id.
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producing evidence, the burden of producing counter-evidence
then shifts to the zoning body which must justify the zoning ac-
tion.30 The test for reasonableness then calls for balancing the
landowner's interests against the public interest. The zoning
agency must show reasonableness "by 'clearly more than "any" ev-
idence'" or suffer the risk of nonpersuasion.3e
As seen from the Flynn case, this shifting-burden approach can
be applied when the landowner disputes an existing zoning regula-
tion as well as when the zoning body attempts to down-zone prop-
erty as in Snell.
A considerably more convoluted approach to shifting the burden
of proof was formulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Ful-
ling v. Palumbo."2 Under the New York scheme, a zoning ordi-
nance may be challenged by a showing that the landowner will suf-
fer a significant financial loss.83 The zoning body must then show
that some legitimate public interest-health, safety, or wel-
fare-will be served by the restriction. Such a showing by the zon-
ing body shifts the burden back to the property owner, who must
"demonstrate that the hardship caused is such as to deprive him of
any use of the property to which it is reasonably adapted, and
that, as a result, the ordinance amounts to a taking of his prop-
erty. '3 4 Although more recent New York opinions still cite Fulling,
the complex pattern of shifting burdens of proof does not appear
in them. 5
The shifting-burden approach has been criticized, especially
when applied to zoning changes initiated by the zoning body, as
possibly preventing the government from easily updating obsolete
zoning plans. 6 As a practical matter, however, even after the bur-
den of proof has shifted to the-government, the government might
have little trouble supporting any but the worst zoning decisions,
because sufficient evidence to make the issue of reasonableness
fairly debatable satisfies the Euclid test.37 It would be very difficult
for courts to develop the shifting-burden approach so as to steer
between these two problems. In any case, other state courts have
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Barrett v. Hamby, 219 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 1975).
32. 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (N.Y. 1967).
33. Id. at 252.
34. Id. at 253 (citation omitted).
35. R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 3.17.
36. 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 294, 303 (1975).
37. Id. at 308.
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developed another approach which is both easier to apply and
more valid theoretically.
The better approach distinguishes between legislative functions
and judicial or quasi-judicial functions of zoning bodies.3 8 This
fundamental departure from the traditional view allows the courts
to take a more active role in reviewing the decisions. Under such a
functional analysis, enactment of a comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance or land use plan would be considered legislative in nature,
while zoning or rezoning of relatively small, specific land areas
would be characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial actions.3 9 The
distinction between the two can be described as follows:
First, judicial action is narrow in scope, focusing on specific indi-
viduals or on specific situations, while legislative action is open-
ended, affecting a broad class of individuals or situations....
Secondly, legislative action results in the formulation of a gen-
eral rule or policy, while judicial action results in the application
of a general rule or policy....
.Thirdly, it is generally stated that judicial action is retrospec-
tive, determining '[t]he rights and duties of parties under existing
law and with relation to existing facts . . . .' By contrast, legisla-
tive action is said to be prospective, determining '[w]hat the law
shall be in future cases....
Lastly, it has been held that the test for judicial action is
whether it is the result of judgment or discretion .... 40
Actions characterized as "legislative" would still be entitled to
the traditional strong presumption of validity.41 Accordingly, par-
ties challenging legislative actions would have the burden of prov-
ing that the actions were arbitrary and capricious or confiscatory.
On the other hand, actions characterized as quasi-judicial would be
subject to additional due process requirements, including "the re-
quirement that the decision be supported by findings which detail
not only the unstated land use policies but also the evidence which
supports either a finding of these policies' applicability or non-ap-
plicability. '42 The challenging party must still meet its burden of
proof, described hereafter, but that burden is less difficult to meet
than proving an action to be unconstitutionally arbitrary and
38. See generally Comment, supra note 3.
39. Id. at 136-37.
40. Id. at 134-36 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
41. See Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 573 P.2d 359, 363 (Wash. 1978).
42. Comment, supra note 3, at 139.
LAND USE REGULATION
capricious.
The newer functional dichotomy was applied in Fasano v. Board
of County Commissioners. ' In Fasano, the Board of County Com-
missioners had rezoned thirty-two acres of land from a single-fam-
ily-residential classification to a planned-residential classification,
which permitted construction of a mobile home park, at the corpo-
rate landowner's request. Homeowners from areas adjacent to the
rezoned land unsuccessfully opposed the rezoning and sued to dis-
allow the zone change." The Commissioners contended that review
of the rezoning was limited to a determination of whether the
change was arbitrary and capricious. 5
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected this contention and found
that the state legislature had "conditioned the county's power to
zone" upon the requirement that the zoning be for the general wel-
fare of the community and that certain enumerated factors be con-
sidered in a comprehensive county land use plan." In setting aside
the Commissioners' rezoning, the court held that the action was
judicial in nature because it encompassed only a small area of land.
The burden of proof must be imposed on the party seeking the
change-in this instance, the corporate landowner-and the court
held that the burden of proof had not been met.47
The Fasano court stated that the necessary proof to support the
zoning change would be that "the change is in conformance with
the comprehensive plan."'4 The court also stated that "[tlhe more
drastic the [zoning] change, the greater will be the burden.'" At a
minimum, a showing that there is a public need for the change,
and that the need would best be satisfied by the change, is re-
quired.50 Mistake in the original plan or ordinance, or changed
43. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
44. Id. at 25.
45. Id. at 27.
46. Id. at 28. The factors included:
The various characteristics of the various areas in the county, the suitability of the
areas for particular land uses and improvements, the land uses and improvements
in the areas, trends in land improvement, density of development, property val-
ues, the needs of economic enterprises in the future development of the areas,
needed access to particular sites in the areas, natural resources of the county and
prospective needs for development thereof, and the public need for healthful, safe,
aesthetic surroundings and conditions.
Id. at 27-28 (quoting 1963 Or. Laws ch. 619, § 4 (repealed 1977)).
47. 507 P.2d at 29.
48. Id. at 28.
49. Id. at 29.
50. Id.
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physical characteristics of the area, might be relevant factors in
meeting this burden in a particular case, although neither would be
a requisite.51 The court characterized the burden of proof to be the
same as the one required in judicial proceedings. It found that the
conclusionary, superficial staff report relied on by the Commission-
ers to support the rezoning was insufficient to meet this burden."
The Fasano approach has been followed by the supreme courts
of Washington," Colorado," Montana,55 Nevada,"6 and Kansas. 7
All of these courts emphasized the importance of guidelines (usu-
ally legislative) for the exercise of quasi-judicial decisionmaking by
local zoning bodies and to guide judicial review of that decision-
making.56 The courts also stressed the requirement that the local
zoning decisions be supported by evidence contained in a verbatim
record.59 Thus, in these cases, the judicial review of the local deci-
sion was not limited to the constitutional "fairly debatable" test of
whether the action was arbitrary and capricious or confiscatory of
the landowner's property; instead, the review was similar to review
of a lower court holding. 0 The use of this scheme is unaffected
whether the zoning body,61 the landowner,62 or other affected par-
ties with standing3 institutes the zoning action.
The importance of legislative guidelines for local zoning actions
serves to distinguish this new approach from the traditional ap-
proach."4 Essentially, guidelines serve to limit the discretion of the
zoning authority. Zoning actions not only must bear the traditional
51. Id.
52. Id. at 29-30.
53. Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 573 P.2d 359 (Wash. 1978); Fleming v. City of Tacoma,
502 P.2d 327 (Wash. 1972).
54. Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1975).
55. Lowe v. City of Missoula, 525 P.2d 551 (Mont. 1974).
56. Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Iric., 516 P.2d 1234 (Nev. 1974).
57. Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978).
58. See, e.g., Lowe v. City of Missoula, 525 P.2d 551, 554 (Mont. 1974); Forman v. Eagle
Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc., 516 P.2d 1234, 1237-38 (Nev. 1974).
59. See, e.g., Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 573 P.2d 359, 365 (Wash. 1978).
60. 507 P.2d at 29.
61. See Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 573 P.2d 359, 361-62 (Wash. 1978); Lowe v. City of
Missoula, 525 P.2d 551, 551 (Mont. 1974).
62. See Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130, 132 (Kan. 1978).
63. See Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371, 372-73 (Colo. 1975); Fleming v. City
of Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327, 328 (Wash. 1972).
64. These guidelines are also central to the constitutional restriction on the delegation of
power to zone from the state to local government. This "nondelegation doctrine" is intended
to prevent the delegation of unbridled discretion. See generally Note, Florida's Adherence
to the Doctrine of Nondelegation of Legislative Power, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 541 (1979).
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"substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare," ' but also must meet the standards set by the legislature.
Further, the local action will be reversed unless evidence in the
record shows that the guidelines were met."6
These guidelines are usually found in the statutory grant of zon-
ing authority to the local government. For instance, the Montana
statute requires that the land use regulations be adopted in accor-
dance with a comprehensive plan and be designed to lessen traffic
congestion, to secure safety from fire and other disasters, to pre-
vent overcrowding, to "facilitate the adequate provision of trans-
portation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public re-
quirements," and with a "view to conserving the value of buildings
and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such
municipality. ' 67 On judicial review of a local decision, the Montana
guidelines also provide the reviewing court with more specific guid-
ance to determine whether a zoning action is proper than does the
simple requirement that a zoning action be for the health, safety,
or welfare of the public.
On the other hand, despite Washington's adoption of the Fasano
functional dichotomy for zoning actions, together with the associ-
ated requirement that proof be discernible to a reviewing court on
a verbatim record, the traditional requirement that actions be for
the health, safety, or welfare of the public continues to be the sole
guideline.68 On review, the local decision in Washington will only
be overturned if shown to be arbitrary and capricious." Although
the local quasi-judicial decision is no longer presumptively valid in
Washington, the challenger still has nearly as difficult a burden as
he would have had under the traditional approach.1
The Fasano approach has generally received favorable response
from the commentators" and is seen as a major step toward secur-
65. 272 U.S. at 395.
66. E.g., Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30.
67. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-2703 (1947). See also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 278.150-.310
(1979); COLo. REV. STAT. §§ 31-23-201 to -209 (1973).
68. Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 573 P.2d 359, 363 (Wash. 1978).
69. Id.
70. In order to avoid the same problem, the Kansas Supreme Court has judicially enu-
merated guidelines for zoning actions and their review that are considerably more detailed
than the arbitrary and capricious standard. Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130,
136-37 (Kan. 1978).
71. 24 CATH. U.L. REV., supra note 36, at 311-12. See also Booth, A Realistic Reexami-
nation of Rezoning Procedure: The Complementary Requirements of Due Process and Ju-
dicial Review, 10 GA. L. REV. 753 (1976); Bross, Circling the Squares of Euclidean Zoning:
Zoning Predestination and Planning Free Will, 6 Evr'L L. 97 (1975); Sullivan, Araby Re-
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ing procedural due process for persons affected by decisions of lo-
cal zoning bodies.7 2 There is the possibility, however, that this ap-
proach could result in frequent substitution of the reviewing
court's judgment for that of the zoning body, resulting in fragmen-
tation of policymaking.73 Also, some zoning decisions are difficult
to characterize as distinctly legislative or quasi-judicaial. 74
In Florida, there are several statutes which provide legislative
guidelines under which local governments exercise delegated power
over land use. These could form the basis for adoption of the
Fasano approach. The two most important are: (1) the Florida En-
vironmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972,'7 and (2)
the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975
(LGCPA).7 6 The Florida Environmental Land and Water Manage-
ment Act of 1972 contains provisions related to areas of critical
state concern 77  and developments of regional impact.78  The
LGCPA requires that local governments7 9 plan for future develop-
ment, adopt comprehensive plans to guide this development, and
enact land development regulations to implement the comprehen-
sive plans.80
Prior to the enactment of the LGCPA, there was considerable
confusion about the power of local governments in Florida to adopt
zoning regulations.81 Florida did not adopt a general zoning ena-
bling act for cities until 1939, or one for counties until 1969, al-
though individual cities and counties had been granted power to
visited: The Evolving Concept of Procedural Due Process Before Land Use Regulatory
Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 50 (1974).
72. Booth, supra note 71, at 766-79; Sullivan, supra note 71, at 68-71.
73. 24 CATH. U.L. REV., supra note 36, at 311.
74. Bross, supra note 71, at 112-13 (pointing out the fluid nature of the terms quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial).
75. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1979).
76. Id. §§ 163.3161-.3211.
77. Id. § 38.05. For a discussion of the procedure for designation of areas of critical state
concern, see Note, supra 64, at 549-51.
78. FLA. STAT. § 380.06 (1979).
79. "'Local government' means any county or municipality or any special district or lo-
cal governmental entity established pursuant to law which exercises regulatory authority
over, and grants development permits for, land development." Id. § 163.3164 (11). "'Devel-
opment permit' includes any building permit, zoning permit, subdivision approval, rezoning,
certification, special exception, variance, or any other official action of local government hav-
ing the effect of permitting the development of land." Id. § 163.3164(6).
80. Id. § 163.3167(1).
81. See the discussion of the historical development of zoning in Florida contained in J.
JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, ZONING ATTACKS & DEFENSES: THE LAW IN FLORIDA §§ 1-5 to
1-7 (1980); O'Connell, Whatever Happened to "Zoning" or What You Need to Know About
"The Local Planning Act" But Don't Know What to Ask!, 50 FLA. B.J. 46 (1976).
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zone land through special acts of the legislature.2
The major reason for the confusion about the powers of local
governments over land use was the number of inconsistent
"sources" of those powers which could be identified. These sources
included the broad "home rule"83 provisions contained in the Flor-
ida Constitution as ratified in 1968,4 the statutes which enumerate
county powers and duties," the Municipal Home Rule Powers
Act,8 6 the county and municipal planning for future development
statutes, 7 and finally the LGCPA. In particular, the permissive na-
ture of several of these sources led to debate over whether a local
governmental body exercising zoning power pursuant to one
"source" would be restricted by the limitations expressed in an-
other "source."
Almost all of this confusion was eliminated by the enactment of
the LGCPA, however. 8 Each of the other "sources" of the zoning
powers contains language to the effect that the powers could not be
exercised inconsistently with a general law. The LGCPA, a general
law, also provides that:
Where this act may be in conflict with any other provision or
provisions of law relating to local governments having authority
to regulate the development of land, the provisions of this act
shall govern unless the provisions of this act are met or exceeded
by other provision or provisions of law relating to local
government.8 9
Therefore, the only remaining doubt about which statutes govern
local land use control in Florida concerns the extent to which pro-
vision in other "sources" involve matters not governed by the
LGCPA or are more rigorous than those in the LGCPA.90 This is-
82. O'Connell, supra note 81, at 46.
83. "Home rule" is the concept that local governments should be granted almost total
control of local matters. Sparkman, The History and Status of Local Government Powers in
Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 271, 285-88 (1973).
84. The most important home rule provisions are in FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1(f), (g),
2(b). Sparkman, supra note 83, at 289-90.
85. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(g), (h) (1979).
86. Id. §§ 166.011-.042.
87. Id. §§ 163.160-.315.
88. Martin, Comprehensive Planning by Local Governments in Florida: A Problem of
Inconsistency, 53 FLA. B.J. 173 (1979); O'Connell, supra note 81, at 47.
89. FLA. STAT. § !63.3211 (1979).
90. It has been stated that the legislature should complete the job it began with the
LGCPA by repealing the statutes which were rendered superfluous by it, in which event
other provisions not inconsistent with the LGCPA could be retained. Martin, supra note 88,
1980]
510 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 8:499
sue does not seem to be a major problem since the new mandatory
requirements of the LGCPA are very complete.
Substantively, the LGCPA requires that each local government
adopt a comprehensive plan "for the orderly and balanced future
economic, social, physical, environmental, and fiscal development
of the area."9 The plan must consist of a number of required ele-
ments.92 The required elements would encompass a future land use
plan, traffic circulation, general waste and potable water, conserva-
tion, recreation and open space, housing, coastal zone protection if
the governmental unit lies in the coastal zone, intergovernmental
coordination, and utilities.98 In addition, a local governmental unit
may adopt any of a number of optional elements.9'4 There are de-
tailed statutory criteria dealing with the form and content of each
of these elements. Additionally, a lengthy procedure for approval
of the plans is set out to assure their quality.9" Public participation
in the process is required, 96 including public hearings after due no-
tice, the records of which are to be open to the public.' 7 Further,
the plans of adjacent local governments must be coordinated. 9
After the comprehensive plan is completed, all land development
regulations enacted or amended must be consistent with the com-
prehensive plan.99 When judicial review is sought of any local gov-
ernmental development regulations, according to the LGCPA, the
comprehensive plan may serve as a guide to the court.100
The LGCPA was enacted, in part, in furtherance of the Florida
Land and Water Management Act of 1972.101 That enactment also
contained guidelines on the exercise of land use regulations by lo-
cal governments. The procedure for designation of developments of
regional impact, contained in the Florida Environmental Land and
Water Management Act of 1972, provides a system whereby devel-
at 174. This would certainly make the statutes easier to understand for anyone who has not
studied them in detail.
91. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(1) (1979).
92. Id. § 163.3177(6).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 163.3177(7).
95. Id. § 163.3184.
96. Id. § 163.3181.
97. Id. § 163.3174.
98. Id. § 163.3177(4).
99. Id. §§ 163.3194(1), .3201. Note that this requirement that land use regulations con-
form to the comprehensive plan is itself an important aspect of the Fasano approach. See
note 48 and accompanying text supra.
100. Id. § 163.3194(3)(a).
101. Id. § 163.3161(2).
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opments which would substantially impact upon more than one
county are subject to special permit requirements to insure that
the regional effects of these larger developments are considered
before construction takes place.""2 In determining whether to ap-
prove a development of regional impact, the local government
must consider the extent to which the development (1) complies
with an adopted state land development plan, 03 (2) is consistent
with local land development regulations, and (3) is consistent with
the report and recommendations of the regional planning
agency.'" In preparing its report and recommendations, the re-
gional planning agency must consider the extent to which the de-
velopment affects (1) the environment and natural resources, (2)
the regional economy, (3) the water, sewer, solid waste disposal or
other necessary public facilities, (4) the public transportation facil-
ities, (5) the ability of the public to find adequate housing accessi-
ble to their employment, (6) the energy consumption, and (7) other
criteria deemed important by the regional planning agency.' °0 The
statutory process also requires that prior to a decision regarding
such a development, public hearings be held after due notice and
that a record of the proceedings be kept.106
A requirement that local governments' land use decisions com-
port with these guidelines, as embodied in the Fasano approach,
would be more consistent with Florida's rigorous approach to the
delegation of legislative power than is the present deference to lo-
cal decisionmaking. 0 7 Adoption of the Fasano approach would,
however, require judicial recognition that the local decision-making
power is a state power in the first instance and that it has merely
been delegated to the local governments.
There was just such a judicial recognition of that principle un-
derlying the decision in Askew v. Cross Key Waterways.'08 In
Cross Key Waterways, the Florida Supreme Court struck the pro-
cess used by the Administration Commission to designate areas of
critical state concern as an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power.10 9 Under the challanged scheme the Administration
102. See note 113 infra.
103. See The Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. §§ 23.0111-
.0115 (1979).
104. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(11) (1979).
105. Id. § 380.06(8).
106. Id. § 380.06(7).
107. See generally Note, supra note 64.
108. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
109. Id. at 925.
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Commission, a state agency composed of the Governor and the
Cabinet, had been delegated some of the powers to regulate land
use which were previously delegated to local governments by the
legislature.110 The First District Court of Appeal had expressed
concern that such a redelegation of that power was offensive to the
tradition of local land use regulation, but it nevertheless recog-
nized the legality of the redelegation, provided that it be accompa-
nied by sufficient standards to satisfy the Florida nondelegation
doctrine."'
When making land regulation decisions, local governments are
exercising powers delegated from the state pursuant to statutes
containing specific guidelines. Therefore, the Fasano requirement
that the guidelines must be followed and promoted by local deci-
sions, and that this be evident from the record, make perfect sense.
Otherwise, the guidelines would be meaningless from their
inception.
A recent Florida appellate court decision, Estuary Properties,
regarding a development of regional impact, appears to have been
a judicial attempt to ameliorate the traditional heavy burden of
proof on landowners who contest local land use regulations. Estu-
ary Properties, Inc. (Estuary) acquired 6,500 acres of land border-
ing state-owned lands in Lee County."' Estuary applied to the Lee
County Board of County Commissioners for approval of a develop-
ment of regional impact 1 and for a zoning change to allow in-
creased density of the development so that Estuary could ulti-
mately construct 26,500 residential units on the property.11 4 The
Lee County Board of County Commissioners denied the applica-
tion, and the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission "
110. Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
aff'd, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
111. Id.
112. 381 So. 2d at 1128.
113. Under FLA. STAT. § 380.06(1) (1979), " 'Development of regional impact,'. means
any development which, because of its character, magnitude, or location, would have a sub-
stantial effect upon the health, safety, or welfare of citizens of more than one county." De-
velopments of regional impact are subject to special permitting by the local government,
after hearings and recommendations by a regional planning authority, in an attempt to in-
sure that the regional effects of these larger developments, beyond the local jurisdictions in
which they are situated, are considered before construction takes place. Pelham, Regulating
Developments of Regional Impact: Florida and the Model Code, 29 U. Fla. L. Rev. 789
(1977). This provision was based upon the ALI, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1975).
Pelham, supra, at 791. For a comprehensive discussion, see T. PELHAM, STATEWIDE LAND-
USE PLANNING AND REGULATION (1979).
114. 381 So. 2d at 1128.
115. Composed of the Governor and the Cabinet. See FLA. STAT. §§ 14.202, 380.07(1)
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denied Estuary's appeal."'
The First District Court of Appeal reversed the Adjudicatory
Commission and Lee County, directing that within thirty days Lee
County should either grant Estuary's application to develop the
land as it wished to, or institute condemnation proceedings to ac-
quire Estuary's land." 7 The court found that the agencies had im-
plicitly assigned to Estuary the burden of proving that the devel-
opment plan would not result in ecological change and pollution of
the adjacent bay.118 It also found that since the legislative intent
behind the development of regional impact statutes was to balance
environmental protection and economic development, assignment
of the burden of proof to the developer was contrary to the statute
and constituted a denial of due process and a taking of property
without just compensation. '9 To reach this result, the court cited
the case of Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control
Authority,'2 for the proposition that a landowner cannot be re-
quired to carry the burden of proof in obtaining permits to develop
his property.' 2'
Unfortunately, the court misconstrued the Zabel case. In Zabel,
appellants' predecessors in title received 11.5 acres of submerged
coastal land in Pinellas County from the Florida Board of Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (BTIITF). 2 Appellants
requested that the Pinellas County Water and Nagivation Control
Authority' 8 fix a bulkhead line and grant a dredge and fill permit
for the land. 2 4 The Authority denied appellants' application and
the circuit court and district court of appeal affirmed."M The Flor-
ida Supreme Court held that the transfer of the submerged land
(1979). See text accompanying notes 145-49 infra, for a discussion of appeal of a local order
to the Adjudicatory Commission.
116. 381 So. 2d at 1131.
117. Id. See Ed Zaagman, Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 277 N.W. 2d 475, 482-91 (Mich.
1979) for an excellent discussion on a court's options once an ordinance is judicially declared
invalid.
118. 381 So. 2d at 1135.
119. Id. at 1132-41.
120. 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
121. 381 So. 2d at 1136.
122. 171 So. 2d at 379. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund
consists of the Governor and the Cabinet and it holds title to and is vested with authority to
control state-owned lands. FLA. STAT. § 253.02(1) (1979).
123. The Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority was a local board
with authority over bulkhead lines and dredge and fill of submerged land. See ch. 57-362, §§
2, 4, 1957 Fla. Laws 806 (repealed 1975).
124. 171 So. 2d at 377.
125. Id. at 377-78.
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carried with it a presumptively valid determination that the public
interest would not be impaired by bulkhead and fill of the land. 1 6
The Zabel decision was based upon a statute which provided
that transferees of submerged lands sold by the BTIITF would
have the right to bulkhead and fill the land.12 7 Therefore, the court
held that the burden of proof should be on the party assailing the
validity of the right to bulkhead and fill derived from the sale by
the BTIITF. 25 In Zabel, that party was the local Water and Navi-
gation Authority. Before Zabel can be applicable at all, however,
the land at issue must have been transferred to the landowner
from the state pursuant to the statutes discussed in Zabel.2" Oth-
erwise, Florida case law has established that the burden of proof in
dredge and fill cases is upon the landowner to show that the per-
mit sought would be in the public interest.130 There was no finding
in Estuary Properties that the land had been transferred from the
state pursuant to these statutes. Therefore, the court could not
properly conclude that Estuary had a presumptively valid right to
dredge and fill based upon the Zabel rationale. In addition, Zabel
only involved certain dredge and fill permits and was not applica-
ble at all to the zoning issues of the Estuary Properties case.
The court's reliance on Zabel in Estuary Properties may have
stemmed from a belief that a landowner should not be required to
bear the traditional heavy burden of proof in challenging local land
use regulation decisions. Florida courts have not adopted either
the shifting-burden or the Fasano approach to this area of law. 8'
According to the interpretation of at least one lower court,182 the
Florida Supreme Court did use language in one case'88 which was
suggestive of a shifting-burden-of-proof analysis. The supreme
court subsequently made it clear, however, that the burden of
proving that a zoning ordinance is confiscatory was to remain on
126. Id. at 380.
127. Ch. 6451, § 5, 1913 Fla. Laws 122 (repealed 1957).
128. 171 So. 2d at 379-80. See also Askew v. Gables-by-the-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d 56 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (Court ordered BTIITF to institute condemnation proceedings
against plaintiff's submerged land previously purchased from the BTIITF since the BTI-
ITF's refusal to allow plaintiff to dredge and fill the land constituted a permanent denial of
use of the land.).
129. See 171 So. 2d at 379-80.
130. Yonge v. Askew, 293 So. 2d 395, 401 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
131. See Dade County v. Yumbo, 348 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Rural
New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
132. Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
133. Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
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the challenging landowner.'" In dictum, one Florida court indi-
cated that when an applicant for a special exception under a zon-
ing code meets the conditions set out in the code, the burden of
proof would be upon the "zoning authority to demonstrate by com-
petent substantial evidence that the special exception is adverse to
the public interest."a 5 That decision, however, is not applicable to
the usual zoning situation.
Florida courts have recognized a distinction between local land
use regulation decisions which are legislative and those which are
quasi-judicial."s6 This distinction is important for determining the
procedure to be followed for obtaining judicial review of a local
land use regulation decision.8 7 Normally, quasi-judicial land use
decisions by local governments will be judicially reviewable by way
of common law writ of certiorari to the circuit court.'" The writ of
certiorari is not available for review of legislative action such as a
direct attack against the facial validity of an ordinance. 18 9 Rather,
an attack on legislative action should take the form of an original
court proceeding in equity."10
The mechanism for judicial review may be altered by statute.
The only extant statutory provisions for judicial review of local
land use decisions appear in the county and municipal planning for
future development statutes"' and the Florida Land and Water
Management Act of 1972.' The first of these provides that deci-
sions of a board of adjustment"8 may be reviewed in the circuit
134. City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1968).
135. Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
136. See generally L. DAVIDSON & M. MAcCoNNELL, FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PaACTICE
SERvicE: FLORIDA ZONING LAw § 5.03 (1980).
137. Id.
138. Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. County of Dade, 166 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1964).
139. G-W Dev. Corp. v. Village of North Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 317 So.
2d 828, 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Note also City of Tallahassee v. Poole, 294 So. 2d
52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), in which it was held that an equitable proceeding was
properly instituted by landowners who were denied rezoning of 71 acres. Although rezoning
is usually considered quasi-judicial, the size of this area would make the action legislative in
nature. See notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text supra.
140. Thompson v. City of Miami, 167 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1964); L. DAVIDSON, supra note
136, at § 5.03(A).
141. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.160-.315 (1979).
142. Id. ch. 380.
143. The board of adjustment is created as part of the local zoning ordinances, FLA.
STAT. § 163.220 (1979), to hear and decide appeals from orders or determinations made by a
local administrative officer in the enforcement of a zoning ordinance or regulation and to
hear and decide "such special exceptions as the board of adjustment is specifically author-
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court either by a trial de novo or by petition for writ of certiorari,
at the election of the appellant. 44 The Florida Land and Water
Management Act of 1972 provides that development orders issued
by local government in regard to a development of regional impact
may be appealed to the Adjudicatory Commission within forty-five
days of the order's rendition."1 5 The Adjudicatory Commission
must hold a hearing pursuant to Florida's Administrative Proce-
dure Act" and must issue an order granting or denying the right
to develop, although it may attach conditions or restrictions to its
order.14 7 Review of the Adjudicatory Commission's order may be
sought by way of petition to the district court of appeal.1 8 When a
development of regional impact is involved, this is the only means
available for judicial review even though there may be a simple
zoning issue involved as well.14' Regardless of the format of judicial
review of the local land use regulation decisions, the traditional
heavy burden of proof remains upon the landowner.
Review of the Estuary Properties decision has been sought by
writ of certiorari in the Florida Supreme Court.150 This case could
provide a good opportunity for the Florida Supreme Court to
adopt a modern model of local land use regulation. The court could
even take a new step toward a unified approach in this area based
upon Florida case law from outside the area of land use regulation.
Florida courts have already demonstrated a predisposition to-
ward a modern view of burden of proof in land use regulation. Of
the two major approaches used to ameliorate the traditional rules
on burden of proof in this area, the Fasano approach, with its em-
phasis upon statutory guidelines, should be adopted in Florida be-
cause it provides greater procedural and substantive protection for
ized to pass on under the terms of the zoning ordinance." Id. § 163.225(2)(a).
144. FLA. STAT. § 163.250 (1979). See Bell v. City of Sarasota, 371 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
145. FLA. STAT. § 380.07(2) (1979).
146. Id. ch. 120.
147. Id. § 380.07(3)-(4).
148. See 381 So. 2d at 1128.
149. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 346 So. 2d 1049, 1054
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The Oregon Legislature, in comparison, has recently taken the
novel step of establishing a Land Use Board of Appeals, a state agency with an appointed
membership, to which all land use decisions are appealed. Ch. 772, §§ 2, 4, 1979 Or. Laws,
reprinted as a note to OR. REv. STAT. ch. 197 (1979). Appeal from a final order of the Board
is available in the Court of Appeal. Id. § 6a. "Land use decisions" is defined to include
substantially all final decisions made by a city, county, special district, or state agency, re-
garding land use, zoning, or comprehensive planning. Id. § 3.
150. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., No. 58,485 (Fla., set for oral argument May 2,
1980).
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the landowner. 15' Further, use of the shifting-burden-of-proof ap-
proach could run afoul of the general rule in Florida "that as in
court proceedings, the burden of proof, apart from statute, is on
the party asserting the affirmative of an issue before an adminis-
trative tribunal. ''1 2
Once it has been recognized that local powers to regulate land
use are delegated from the state, as was done in Cross Key Water-
ways, it is incumbent upon the courts to require that the legisla-
tive guidelines for the exercise of that power be met. Otherwise,
the legislative purpose is thwarted. A judicial adoption of the
Fasano approach would be an appropriate response by the judici-
ary to the design of the legislative delegation of local land use reg-
ulation. If the judiciary does not adopt this approach, the legisla-
ture should do so in order to preserve the benefits of the legislative
guidelines on local decisionmaking.
The Florida Supreme Court has already stated that a reviewing
court may overturn the decision of the local land use authority
when that decision is not supported by competent substantial evi-
dence in the record. 1 3 The scope of such review is still limited to
the traditional test of whether sufficient competent evidence is
available to make the decision of the local authority fairly debata-
ble. ' 4 With adoption of the Fasano approach, the review of local
quasi-judicial land use decisions would require determination of
whether there was competent substantial evidence on the record to
show that the action taken furthers the statutory standards con-
151. See text accompanying notes 71 & 72 supra.
152. Balino v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 348 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
153. Skaggs-Albertson's v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1978). The term
"competent substantial evidence" when used in relation to review by certiorari of an admin-
istrative order was explained in De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957) as
follows:
We have used the term "competent substantial evidence" advisedly. Substantial
evidence has been described as such evidence as will establish a substantial basis
of fact from which the fact at issue can be reasonably inferred. We have stated it
to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. . . .In employing the adjective "competent" to modify the
word "substantial," we are aware of the familiar rule that in. administrative pro-
ceedings the formalities in the introduction of testimony common to the courts of
justice are not strictly employed. . . .We are of the view, however, that the evi-
dence relied upon to sustain the ultimate finding should be sufficiently relevant
and material that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the
conclusion reached. To this extent the "substantial" evidence should also be
"competent." (citations omitted).
154. See Bell v. City of Sarasota, 371 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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tained in the delegation of authority to take such an action.
One further step is needed-recognition that even those actions
characterized as "legislative" under Fasano are actually made pur-
suant to authority delegated from the state, just as much as the
quasi-judicial actions are. Thus, the characterization of these sup-
posedly legislative actions as "quasi-legislative" would be more ac-
curate. 1 5 The important result of this characterization is that for
judicial review of quasi-legislative actions, 165 as well as of quasi-
judicial actions, the test for validity of the actions would be
whether the legislative standards or guidelines were complied
with. 117 This is a more exacting standard than the "arbitrary and
capricious" test.
When the proper test for validity of the action has not been sat-
isfied, the reviewing court must order a proper remedy (regardless
of which test the court has applied). The first question which must
be addressed as to remedy is whether the landowner may receive
monetary compensation or must be content with invalidation of
the local action. The general rule in Florida has been that:
[The] enactment of a zoning ordinance under the exercise of po-
lice power does not entitle the property owner to seek compensa-
tion for the taking of the property through inverse condemna-
tion .... If the zoning ordinance as applied to the property
involved is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory or confiscatory
... , the relief available to the property owner is a judicial deter-
mination that the ordinance is either invalid, or unenforceable as
pertains to plaintiff's property. 158
The United States Supreme Court has decided no case on point,
but the rule that a landowner may not receive monetary compensa-
tion, as stated above, is supported by the weight of authority." 9
155. The power to promulgate regulations to effect a general public purpose under a
statute is quasi-legislative. Daniel v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 213 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla.
1968).
156. Those characterized as legislative in text accompanying notes 39 & 40 supra.
157. See Lee v. Delmar, 66 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 1953) ("The power of the [agency] is
limited to the yardstick laid down by the Legislature ... ").
158. Mailman Dev. Corp, v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 717 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (citation
omitted).
159. E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), afl'd on other grounds,
[1980] U.S.L.W. 4700 (June 10, 1980); Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979);
Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
429 U.S. 990 (1976).
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Once there is a judicial determination that a local zoning action
is invalid, several remedies are available to the court, including the
following: (1) leave the area unzoned, (2) allow the landowner to
develop in a way determined appropriate by the court, (3) allow
the landowner to develop according to his proposed use, (4) re-
mand to the local zoning authority to adopt a proper decision
within a set time, or (5) remand for a determination by the local
authority of the proper use of the property. 160 Of these, the fourth
alternative presents the best opportunity for the local authority to
use its expertise to balance interests in arriving at a result more
equitable than "one land use extreme or the other."' 1
In Estuary Properties, the Florida First District Court of Appeal
remanded to the Adjudicatory Commission to grant the corporate
landowner permission to develop without hindrance. 62 The order
was to terminate only if Lee County instituted condemnation pro-
ceedings in the circuit court within thirty days of the court's entry
of judgment."'s This holding fits alternative (3), above-it allows
the landowner to develop according to his proposed use. That rem-
edy has the disadvantage of allowing the landowner to develop his
property exactly as he wishes, without consideration for other eq-
uitable uses of the property which might have less potential nega-
tive impact on the overall plan for development of surrounding
areas.'" The court did hold that the county could institute con-
demnation proceedings against the property, if it wished, rather
than allowing the property to be developed according to the land-
owner's wishes.'" This is not very helpful, however, since counties
have the power to take property by eminent domain anyway. 66
There is one final statutory remedy available to the landowner in
certain situations in Florida. If the landowner believes that an ac-
tion by a state agency pursuant to any of several enumerated stat-
utes, including the development of regional impact process, has
"taken" his property without due process, he may institute an ac-
tion in circuit court.'17 If the circuit court agrees, it must remand
the issue "to the agency which shall, within a reasonable time: (a)
160. Ed Zaagman, Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 277 N.W.2d 475, 482-83 (Mich. 1979).
161. Id. at 488.
162. 381 So. 2d at 1140-41.
163. Id.
164. Ed Zaagman, Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 277 N.W.2d 475, 486-88 (Mich. 1979).
165. See 381 So. 2d at 1140-41.
166. FLA. STAT. § 127.01 (1979).
167. Id. § 380.085(2).
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Agree to issue the permit; (b) Agree to pay appropriate monetary
damages; ... or (c) Agree to modify its decision to avoid an unrea-
sonable exercise of police power." 168 The agency, and not the court,
selects the option for a given circumstance, 69 and the remedy is
thus like alternative (4), above-it requires remand to the local
zoning authority to adopt a proper decision within a set time. This
remedy was not sought in the Estuary Properties case.
The Florida Supreme Court should take advantage of the oppor-
tunity presented by a case like Estuary Properties and adopt the
modern Fasano approach to judicial review of quasi-judicial deci-
sions in the context of land use control. The court should also ap-
ply the Fasano requirements to quasi-legislative actions. If the
court does not take this action, the legislature should do so in or-
der to give new life to the statutory guidelines on local land use
regulation. A final alternative available to the legislature, besides
statutory adoption of the Fasano requirements is to define local
governments for purposes of local land use as "agencies" within
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 70 That would result in
practically the same procedural and substantive safeguards since
local governments would thereby be required to show by compe-
tent substantial evidence that the statutory guidelines are met in
individual actions. 17 1
In fact, the necessity of making the sometimes subtle distinction
between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative administrative action
has already been eliminated under the APA. The only disadvan-
tage of defining local governments as agencies within the APA for
purposes of local land use would be that judicial review would then
take place in the district courts of appeal rather than the circuit
courts, increasing the caseload of the appeal courts. 7 8 Of course,
168. Id. § 380.085(3).
169. See Rhodes, Compensating Police Power Takings: Chapt. 78-85, Laws of Florida, 6
FLA. ENVT'L & URB. ISSUES 1 (1978).
170. "Agency" for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act is defined in FLA. STAT.
§ 120.52(1) (1979). See Sweetwater Utility Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 314 So. 2d 194
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); [19751 Fla. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 075-140 (May 16, 1975); and
L. DAVIDSON, supra note 136, at § 5.03 for the proposition that the Administrative Proce-
dure Act is not applicable to zoning. One commentator believes that adoption of state ad-
ministrative procedure acts and application of.them to zoning is likely to develop into a
trend in the future. Sullivan, supra note 71, at 78.
171. Administrative actions must be consistent with the statutes under which they are
taken. DeThorne v. Beck, 280 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
172. See School Bd. v. Mitchell, 346 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State ex
rel. Dep't of General Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
173. See Gulf Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc., 361 So. 2d 695
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the caseload in the circuit courts would be correspondingly re-
duced. An exception to review in the court of appeal would be a
direct attack on the constitutionality of a statute or rule or regula-
tion, in which event jurisdiction lies in the circuit courts.7 4 The
advantages of defining local governments as agencies would include
increased uniformity of treatment of administrative actions by
both state agencies and local governments acting under authority
delegated from the state, and the demise of the sometimes difficult
distinction between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative actions in
the context of local land use regulation.
Whether the Fasano requirements are adopted with or without
modification of appellate review jurisdiction, or whether the re-
quirements are effectively adopted by making local governments
"agencies" within the Administrative Procedure Act for purposes
of land use regulation, the condition that local governments fur-
ther the guidelines contained in their grants of authority to regu-
late land use should be imposed.
(Fla. 1978); Carrollwood State Bank v. Lewis, 362 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
174. Gulf Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc., 361 So. 2d 695
(Fla. 1978); Carrollwood State Bank v. Lewis, 362 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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